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This paper1 reports on laboratory market experiments that were conducted in Moscow 
during the fall of 1992. Two broad concerns guided the design of the experiments. The 
first concern is the obvious cultural differences between people in Russia and those in the 
west where traditional laboratory market experiments have been conducted. Most 
economists who have conducted experiments would assume that cultural background 
would not play a major part in the equilibration process, and that the law of supply and 
demand would operate essentially the same in all cultures and at all times. As Russia is 
undergoing a dramatic social change and before an orientation to market attitudes 
permeates the society, a unique opportunity presented itself to test this assumption about 
the universal nature of the laws ofthe market. 
In the language of the experimenters, this first concern is whether or not some of the 
known properties of markets that operate in western culture are robust to major changes 
in the culture ofthe subject population. The properties of markets that are of interest are 
the fact of equilibration, the influence of price ceilings on equilibration and the influence 
of the asymmetries in the shapes ofthe demand and supply curves on the direction of 
convergence to equilibrium. The second concern reflects a desire to explore some more 
recently discovered aspects of market behavior. A transactions cost was added to the 
market and the question posed was whether or not the cost frustrated or biased 
equilibration (Jamison and Plott, 1997).2 
The results of the experiments were not as anticipated. The standard convergence process 
was observed but when the data were applied to test the asymmetric rent hypothesis or 
the hypothesis regarding the nonbinding price controls, some surprises surfaced. In 
particular the data were not the same as had been observed in other experiments. This 
paradoxical failure of previous results to generalize prompted a detailed investigation into 
the behavior of individuals in the experiments. The hope was to find the causes of the 
1The fmancial support of the Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political Science and of 
the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We also want to thank John Patty for his 
helpful comments. 
2 Julian C. Jamison and Charles R. Plott, "Costly Offers and the Equilibration Properties ofthe Multiple 
Unit Double Auction Under Conditions of Unpredictable Shifts of Demand and Supply," Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 32 (1997):591-612. 
discrepancies. A special section of the paper is devoted to a conjecture that resulted from 
the ex-post examination of the data and is offered as an explanation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section the purposes of the project are 
outlined in greater detail. The second section contains the experimental design, 
procedures and parameters. The third section contains the predictions of alternative 
models as applied to the special case of the parameters of the experiments. The fourth 
section contains the results of the experiments. The fifth section contains the post 
experiment speculations about the possible explanations of the surprising dynamic 
behavior. Here the idea of Hvatat, which means "to grab" in Russian, is introduced and 
explored. The final section is a summary of conclusions. 
1. AN OUTLINE OF PURPOSE 
The differences between the east and the west that stem from the cultural and economic 
histories include differences in the a priori beliefs of researchers about the basic 
principles ofbehavior that lie beneath individual actions. The tendency of western 
scientists has been to rely on the competitive equilibrium model as a guide for what might 
be expected from markets. On the other hand Professors Menshikova3 and Menshikov4 
have been close to the application and computation of cooperative game models of 
market-like phenomena. The existence of differences in modeling philosophy suggested 
the need for a conservative approach to experimentation. Thus the conservative research 
approach taken here was to first test to determine the capacity of the competitive model to 
predict the behavior of markets with Russian subjects. Thus the broad, research 
motivating questions are as listed below. 
(i) Does the competitive equilibrium model have the ability to predict the markets with 
these subjects? Or, do the markets obey some set of principles completely unrelated to 
any of the standard market models? 
(ii) Do the markets in Russia have some of the same empirical properties characteristics 
of the dynamics of the price adjustment process that have been observed in experimental 
markets in the west? 
(iii) Do markets with Russian subjects converge to equilibrium from above when the 
consumer surplus is greater than producer surplus (as it does in market experiments 
conducted in the west)? 
30. R. Menshikova, "On Computation ofthe Generalized Nucleolus," USSR Computational Mathematics 
and Mathematical Physics 16 (1976): 1121-1135. 
40. R. Menshikova and I. S. Menshikov, The Generalized Nucleolus and a Solution of a Continuous 
Allocation Problem, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, 1983 . 
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(iv) Do nonbinding price controls have the same effect on the convergence process with 
Russian subjects as such controls do when experiments are conducted in the west? 
(v) Do markets equilibrate in the presence of a "transactions cost" placed on bids and 
asks and do such transactions costs have the same influence on the markets with the 
Russian subjects as have been observed in the west? 
The first properties are very prominent in the data in western markets. Equilibration is 
almost always observed and the process of equilibration has some distinct properties. 
Similarly, the asymmetry of rents has a pronounced effect on the direction of 
convergence as does the presence of nonbinding price controls. The research strategy 
was to test for properties of markets, the absence of which would be very visible and easy 
to detect without a large number of experiments. The idea was to pose very focused 
questions of the form "can the phenomena be detected in this subject pool" as opposed to 
"how big is the effect in this subject pool." The former question can be answered with 
fewer observations while the latter question may never be answerable given the limited 
resources available for research. The final question (v) is relatively new to the 
experimental literature and reported results have not been fully replicated. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, PROCEDURES AND PARAMETERS 
A total of thirteen experiments were conducted in Moscow. Subjects were drawn from 
five different subject pools. Three different institutional environments were studied. Each 
experiment had 10 subjects. A period zero was conducted in which subjects were not 
paid. After the period zero the aggregate parameters (but not individual parameters) were 
constant for ten periods after which demand was shifted upward unannounced. The 
experiment then continued for another 9 periods. The fact that these parameters were 
exactly the same across all experiments allows some comparisons of subject pool 
differences. 
Demand and supplies were induced using standard procedures and stated in an 
experimental currency called francs. Subjects were all aware of the rates of conversion 
between the experimental francs and rubles (If= .3 rubles). Incentives were substantial 
relative to those that have typically been used in experiments in the west. The average 
earnings from the experiments was about 1400 rubles which was about twice the monthly 
stipend of 720 rubles per month that students received and about one third of the 
monthly wage in November 1992 of 4 200 rubles that was the salary of the typical adult 
that participated in the experiments. 
Table 1 contains a listing of all experiments by subject pool and by treatment variables. 
The indexing numbers refer to the date on which the experiment was conducted. This 
manner of indexing the experiments is used throughout the text and in all records. All 
experiments were conducted through a local area network using the electronic multiple 
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unit double auction programs . This program follows the rules of the multiple unit double 
auction process outlined by Plott and Gray (1990)6 including the rules that only the best 
bid and the best ask be exposed to the market. 
The subject pools were as follow. A. Moscow University undergraduate students in 
applied mathematics. These subjects had no experience with any type of experimental 
market. B. Students from Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. Students are 
admitted to this Institute only after having demonstrated exceptional abilities in the 
sciences. Several of the subjects were members of Professor Menshikov's class in which 
both games and markets had been discussed. Several knew about the double auction. C. 
Students from Russian Open University. These subjects were from adult education 
classes in business and applied mathematics. D. Mixed adults consisted of faculty and 
graduate students from the Moscow University. E. Teenagers. These teenage subjects 
were from a special school for talented students with age ranging from 13 to 15 years old. 
The institutional environments were as follows. Four basic experiments were conducted. 
These experiments were the standard multiple unit double auction with no special 
institutional changes. Four additional experiments were conducted in which a 
nonbinding price ceiling was imposed on the market. Neither bids nor asks could be 
tendered for amounts above the ceiling. The ceiling was either 20 francs above the 
highest competitive equilibrium price (2 experiments) or 30 francs above that price (2 
experiments). As will be explained along with the details of the experiment 
below, the ceiling was increased two periods before a demand shift (upward) so there are 
in each of the four price ceiling experiments, two periods in which the ceiling was either 
60 or 70 francs above the highest competitive equilibrium price. Five experiments were 
conducted in which a tax was placed on all bids and similarly a tax was placed on all 
asks. No tax was placed on an individual who accepted a bid or an ask. The amount of the 
tax was either 4 francs (2 experiments),3 francs (two experiments) or 2 francs (1 
experiment) and was the same constant amount independent of the number of units 
offered. That is, a bid of 1 unit cost the bidder, say 4 francs, and a bid of 5 units also cost 
the bidder 4 francs. 
The parameters can be understood with the help ofFigure 1, the aggregate demand and 
supply and Table 2, the individual redemption values and costs. The curves DD and SS 
existed before the shift at period 11 and the curves D'D' and S'S' existed beginning with 
period 11. The units are in experimental francs which were worth 0.3 rubles each. The 
upward shift in the curves is by 40 francs added to both the demand curve and the supply 
curve. As can be seen the consumer surplus is greater than the producer surplus. The 
ratio is 1.882. 
5Charles R. Plott," A Computerized Laboratory Market System and Research Support Systems for the 
Multiple Unit Double Auction," Social Science Working Paper 783, California Institute of Technology, 
November 1991. 
6 Charles R. Plott and Peter Gray, "The Multiple Unit Double Auction," Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 13 (1990):245-258. North Holland. 
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While the aggregate demand and supply parameters were constant for several periods 
before a shift in parameters, the individual parameters were not constant. The incentives 
for each individual changed every period. An individual was either a buyer or a seller 
throughout the experiment. At the beginning of the period each individual was given a 
stapled "stack" of redemption values (buyers) or costs (sellers). At the end of a period the 
individual removed the top sheet to reveal the incentive chart for the next period. The 
incentive charts were grouped in "schedules ". Examples of such schedules are shown in 
Table 2. 
Individuals were recruited by announcements in classes. They were told that they were 
going to participate in an experiment and that they would be paid. They were not told the 
amounts. When assembled, the individuals worked through a computerized instruction 
program that familiarized them with the keys and their functions in an 
electronic market. The instructions were all translations into Russian of instructions that 
are used in the west (Plott 1991). 
After the instructions were completed the individuals participated in a period zero for 
practice. For this period they were not paid. After the practice period the records were 
checked carefully and confusion about the accounting were explained to subjects 
individually. 
Period zero was 1 0 minutes. All succeeding periods were 5 minutes. If a price ceiling 
was in place it was imposed at the first of the experiment including period zero. The 
ceiling was then increased by forty francs in period 9. 
In period 11 the second set of parameters came into existence. These new parameters 
were built into the stack of incentive schedules that the subject was given at the 
beginning. No announcement was made about the parameter change and all incentives 
were private information. Thus, given the method of giving incentives, the change could 
have easily gone unnoticed by the subjects. 
3. COMPETITIVE MODEL AND PROPERTIES OF INTEREST 
As shown in figure 1 the competitive equilibrium is [350, 360] for the first set of 
parameters and after the shift in period 11 to the second set of parameters the competitive 
equilibrium is [390, 400]. There are many competitive equilibrium prices in these ranges 
(10 francs) but there is only one equilibrium quantity. The price range reflects an 
acknowledgment of a transactions cost that is known to exist in markets. For purposes of 
analysis the middle of the price range will be treated as the prediction ofthe model. That 
is, the competitive equilibrium price prediction with a subjective transactions cost 
included is 355 before the shift and 395 after the shift. 
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Rent Asymmetry Property. It is well documented that when consumer surplus is greater 
than the producer surplus, prices tend to come into equilibrium from above the 
equilibrium price. Under the parameters of all expenses, the rate of consumers' surplus to 
producers' is 1.8. 
Price adjustment dynamics. A few stylized facts have been produced about the nature of 
the convergence process in the double auction market. First, it known that the number 
bids relative to the number of asks will predict price movements. Secondly, the prices at 
which asks are taken tend to be above the prices at which bids are taken. The question is 
whether these known properties will reproduce in this subject pool. 
Price ceilings. One of the paradoxes of experimental markets is that nonbinding price 
ceilings have an effect on the market. Ceilings placed above the equilibrium but near the 
equilibrium tend to make the prices approach equilibrium from below. The question 
posed is whether this property can be detected in the Russian subject population. 
Transactions costs. Study of Table 2, reveals that the price "tunnel" is 10 francs. The tax 
on bids and asks was not sufficient to make marginal trades completely unprofitable 
unless the subjective transactions costs is 5 francs. However, the transaction costs do 
affect the search activity in a market. It is always in the interest of one side of the market 
to let the other side make a bid/ask of a given level. Results reported in the literature 
(Jamison and Plott 1997) hold that convergence to the equilibrium does occur but this 
needs to be checked. The possibility exists that the market could get "stuck" at prices 
removed from the competitive equilibrium because each agent does not want to bear the 
transactions cost and waits for someone else to do it. This type of public goods/ 
prisoner's dilemma could conceptually prevent convergence to the equilibrium of demand 
and supply. While the existing study reports price convergence, it also reports that the 
tax decreases the number of bids and asks and lowers efficiency. The question posed 
here is whether it has the same effect with Russian subjects. 
Hvatat. In Russian Hvatat means "to grab". The concept is used to motivate a series of 
notions that will be introduced in the special section that follows the results. As will 
become clear in the results section, the markets do not behave exactly as expected and an 
the special section is an ex-post attempt to explain what happened and why. 
4. RESULTS 
The price time series of all experiments are contained in Figures 2 through 14. Shown in 
the figures are the prices of contracts in the order in which the contracts were executed. 
The vertical axis is price measured in experimental francs per unit and the horizontal axis 
is time measured in seconds. The vertical lines designate the end and beginning of 
periods during the experiment. The average of the competitive equilibrium prices are 
shown as the horizontal lines. The range of the equilibria is five francs on either side of 
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such a line. In experiments in which a price ceiling exists the ceiling is represented by a 
dotted line ( the uppermost horizontal line). 
Several prominent features are evident from just a brief study of the graphs. First, prices 
in all experiments converge toward the competitive equilibrium price. When the 
parameter change occurs in period 11 the prices move away from the old equilibrium 
toward the new equilibrium. Notice that the variance in prices is greater during the first 
part of a period and in the early periods. 
The first result formalizes what can be learned from a glance at the figures. It is clear that 
the competitive equilibria capture a prominent feature of market behavior in these subject 
pools. The collection of principles that are the foundation ofthis model cannot be rejected 
as describing behavior in the Russian population. The results demonstrate that there is no 
need for a completely different set of behavioral principles. The principles of market 
behavior found in the existing literature do a good job. However, the observation that 
follows the result demonstrates that market behavior can certainly differ across subject 
pools in Russia. 
RESULT 1. Prices converge to near the upper bound of the competitive equilibria 
interval was observed across experiments. 
SUPPORT. The theoretical competitive equilibrium is [350, 360] for the first set of 
parameters and after the shift in period 11 to the second set of parameters the competitive 
equilibrium is [390, 400]. The destination and the direction of the price convergence was 
evaluated by the application of a modified version of a simple dynamic model, [Noussair, 
Plott, Riezman, 1995].7 The model assumes that price (dependent variable) may start 
from a different origin for each experiment, but as the number of periods becomes large 
the limit of convergence is assumed to be to a common asymptote. Formally the model is 
as follows: 
where i is the index ofthe experiment, Dj are dummy variables that take value 1 ifi=j and 
value 0 otherwise, tis measured in terms of experimental period number, K is number of 
experiments, Pit is the average price in period t of the experiment i, u is a random 
variable, distributed normally with 0 mean. B1j measures origin of the price convergence 
process and B2 is its asymptote ifthe number of periods is infinitely large. The interim ( 
when the number of periods is finite) estimate of the asymptote of convergence in the 
experimentj is computed as PI\ =BjT(l/T)+Bl(T-1)/T), where the bold letters are 
parameter estimates, T is the total number of periods in the experiment. Notice that when 
T becomes sufficiently large all asymptote estimates converge to a common value B2 and 
the computed estimate becomes PI\= B2. 
7 Charles N. Noussair, Charles R. Plott and Raymond G. Riezman, "An Experimental Investigation ofthe 
Patterns oflntemational Trade, The American Economic Review 85, no. 3 (1995):462-491. 
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Data in Tables 3 and 4 show ordinary least squares estimations of the model, PA, before 
and after the shift in the parameters (11th period) respectively. Parameters of main 
interest, the computed asymptotes, are presented in the fourth columns of the tables. 
Before the shift occurred (Table 3), in all but one experiment the estimated asymptotes of 
the convergence have values between 357 and 361. Remember that the set of competitive 
equilibrium prices is the interval [350-360]. Thus the convergence was consistently at the 
upper bound of the CE set. A similar picture can be observed after the shift has occurred 
(Table 4). In all experiment the asymptotes were estimated to be between 399 and 401, 
while the CE interval is [390-400]. Therefore, convergence to a new competitive 
equilibrium has occurred after the shift, and the asymptotes of such convergence were at 
the upper bound of the CE set as well. 
Observation 1. Behavioral differences exist among the different Russian subject pools 
before the shift in parameters occurred in the 11th period. Support for this phenomena is 
weak at best after the shift. 
SUPPORT. For each experiment the variances ofthe transaction prices were computed 
for the periods 1 through 10, and for the periods 11 through 19 separately. The relevant 
data are in Table 5. If only the data that appear in the third column of the table are taken 
into account ( periods 1 through 1 0) then the experiments can be ordered according to this 
variance measure as follows: Moscow Physical Technical Institute (1 0, 25); mixed 
subjects (11); Moscow State University (02, 05, 06, 03, 13); teenagers (28); Russian 
Open University (27, 14, 30, 26). That is, the two Phys. Tech. markets have the lowest 
variance. The mixed subjects have the next lowest, etc. Experiment 26 at the Russian 
Open University has the highest variance. Notice that no overlap exists among these 
groups in the sense that each subject pool clustered according to this measure. However 
this clean picture does not hold when the later periods of the experiments are taken into 
account. As data in the last column of Table 5 show Phys. Tech. subjects have higher 
(compared to the first 1 0 periods ) variances ( 4 and 7 before the shift, 9 and 11 after the 
shift) while the ROU subjects have lower or the same variances ( 23,25, 17 and 24 before 
the shift, and 10, 12, 17 and 13 after the shift). The overall picture is that in the first 10 
periods there is a clear behavioral difference according to the price variances in the 
subject pools but in the last 10 periods there is no clear behavioral difference when 
measured by price variance. 
The second result addresses the question about the influence of rent asymmetries. The 
reported result as found in the literature is that when parameters are such that the 
competitive equilibrium rents are asymmetric, favoring the buyers, prices start high about 
the equilibrium and converge into the equilibrium from above. The result states that the 
markets in Russia behave differently than the markets that have been studied in the west. 
RESULT 2. No pronounced tendency exists for these markets to converge from above. 
Thus the data have no strong support for the asymmetric rent hypothesis. However, there 
is some weak support. 
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SUPPORT. The numbers in Table 6 are the average transaction prices per period, per 
experiment. In only 49 of the 130 periods that constituted the first ten periods of 
experiments were average prices above the highest competitive equilibrium price of 360 
and in only 33 of 116 periods that constituted the last set of periods of experiment were 
average prices above the highest competitive equilibrium price of 400. Also as the 
econometric model discussed above suggests, in only 5 of the 13 experiments the 
direction of price convergence was from above. This can be seen by comparing the first 
(estimate of origin) and the last (estimate of asymptote) columns of the Table 3 . In only 
five cases (experiments 10,14, 26, 27, 30) is the origin higher than the asymptote. 
The weak support lies in the fact that the B2 estimate is above the competitive equilibrium 
prices range. Thus, while these markets do not start far above the competitive 
equilibrium and converge downward, the prices are nevertheless on average high relative 
to the competitive equilibrium. That is, prices are converging on average, to a point 
above the competitive equilibrium range. 
The third result explores the impact of the price ceiling. Price ceilings above the 
competitive equilibrium are reported to cause the price adjustments to converge from 
below. That feature was not observed in the Russian markets. The next result makes that 
clear. 
RESULT 3. No dampening effect of the nonbinding price ceiling can be detected in the 
data. 
SUPPORT. Price ceilings were imposed in four experiments: 06, 10, 11 and 27. 
Consider only the first ten periods of an experiment before a shift, and compare the 
estimates of the origin and the asymptote (Table 3). The estimates suggest that the 
convergence was from above in two ofthese four experiments (10 and 27), and the 
convergence was from below in the other two experiments ( 06 and 11). Also, of the forty 
periods (periods 1 through 10 in these four experiments) only seven had prices below the 
lowest competitive equilibrium price (Table 6). Therefore, prices cannot be said to be 
below equilibrium or to approach the equilibrium from below in these experiments. 
Result 1 suggests that the transaction cost did not prevent convergence to the competitive 
equilibrium. That fact is summarized by the next result. The result also documents that 
the transaction cost does have expected effects. 
RESULT 4. The existence of a transactions cost: 
(i). did not prevent the convergence to the competitive equilibrium; 
(ii) decreased the number of bids and asks; and, 
(iii) increased the number of multiple unit bids and asks. 
SUPPORT. First consider part (i). The taxes on bids and asks were imposed in 
experiments 13, 14, 25, 28 and 30. Estimates of origins and asymptotes in the Tables 3 
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and 4 can be used to assess the degree to which these experiments were converging to the 
competitive equilibria. Of the five experiments (before and after each shift ) only one 
asymptote estimate (experiment 14 before the shift) has a hint of being significantly 
different from the competitive equilibria (363), compared to the upper bound of the price 
range at 360, and the magnitudes of the deviation is small. In other cases all of the 
asymptotes estimates are near the CE level as can be seen from the numbers in the last 
columns of the Tables 3 and 4 . Clearly there is a general tendency for these markets to 
converge. 
Consider next part (ii). As can be seen from the second and the third columns of Table 7 
numbers of Bids/Asks made in the experiments that involved price ceilings (shadowed 
rows) are consistently lower (with one exception- experiment 10) than the numbers of 
Bids/ Asks made in the other experiments. 
Finally consider part (iii). The average of the shadowed numbers in the last column of 
Table 7 ( numbers of multiple units bids and asks when the price ceiling is imposed ) is 
194, while the same average for the other experiments 146. Therefore, it is concluded that 
price ceiling resulted in an increase in the numbers of multiple units bids and asks. 
The next result concerning the importance of bids and asks is rather surprising. One of 
the most persistent properties of market convergence behavior has been the relationship 
between price changes, the number of bids and the number of asks. In particular, for 
markets in the west, the number of bids in a period minus the number of asks is a 
predictor of price movements in the following period. That is not true of the Russian 
markets. 
RESULT 5. The bid/ask adjustment equation does not predict price movements in these 
markets. 
SUPPORT. The equation Pt- Pt-1 =a+ b [(number ofbids in t-1)- (number of asks 
in t-1)] was estimated for each experiment. Pt =average price in period t. The first period 
and the period immediately following the shift were not used in the estimation. The 
estimated coefficients are presented in Table 8. Notice that the coefficient b (the third 
column of the Table) has a positive sign as is the case in all but two experiments (28 and 
30). However, the significance level (the t-statistic as shown in the last column of the 
Table) was low ( less than 2) in all cases but two of the thirteen 
experiments (05 and 11 ). Therefore, we conclude that the bid/ask adjustment equation 
does not predict price movements in these markets. 
The next result is known to the literature. It reflects the advantage of the first mover that 
follows from game theoretic intuition. 
RESULT 6. The price of contracts in which an ask to sell was accepted by a buyer tend 
to be higher than the contract price in which a bid to buy was accepted by a seller. 
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SUPPORT. The average price of the contracts in which an ask was taken by a buyer was 
computed for every period of every experiment as was the average price of the contracts 
in which as bid was taken by a seller. The numbers in Table 9 are differences between the 
former and the latter. Empty cells mean that these were periods with either no asks taken 
or were periods in which no bids were taken. In only 5 of the 246 periods was the 
difference less than zero. Therefore asks taken are at higher prices than are bids taken. 
5. THE HVATATPROPERTY 
The above section makes it clear that these experiments with Russian subjects have some 
properties that are different from markets studied in the west. Support for the asymmetric 
rent hypothesis is weak at best. The number of bids minus the number of asks does not 
predict price changes well; and nonbinding price ceilings do not have the expected effect. 
In addition, the behavior of the markets differs across subject pools thereby providing 
support for a presumption that the key to the differences resides in the properties of 
individuals as opposed to the experimental environment. A natural question to pose is 
whether the sociological background and life experiences could account for what is 
observed. 
In Russian," hvatat" means "to grab." The basic idea of Hvatat is that some buyers and 
sellers whom we will refer to as "rabbits," bring their worldly experiences to the 
laboratory with them and are anxious to trade. Coming from a world of shortages their 
instincts are to" grab," to be quick to acquire anything of value while the opportunity 
exists. Buyers who are rabbits have a propensity to accept whatever ask is tendered if it 
is profitable for them and sellers who are rabbits have a tendency to accept whatever bid 
is tendered as long as it is profitable. The propensity to act passively and accept offers is 
accompanied by a tendency to rush wherever they suspect that something of value might 
exist and " grab it" quickly before someone else does. This is all tempered by a tendency 
towards myopia in the sense that the subjects do not gather or process relevant 
information that might lead them to alternative strategies involving waiting and 
negotiating. Of course, such anxiousness and myopia are not consistent with the spirit of 
game theory which would have the same agents seeking higher profits by developing a 
more thoughtful search strategy. 
Thus in a sense, the principles with which we begin are based on a sort of irrationality 
that is fostered by experiences, expectations and instincts that were developed outside the 
laboratory. However, these life experiences do not have the same impact on all people. 
Behavior differs within this subject pool. 
A second type of subject, that we will call wolf, evolves in response to the existence of 
rabbit behaviors. Wolves exhibit a type of hunting/predator behavior that is forward 
looking and appears to be in the spirit of a best response to the rabbits. They set traps and 
move to be in a position to capitalize on the habits of the rabbits. Thus, as hunters the 
wolves are "trappers" who anticipate the movements of the prey and set a trap reflecting 
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that anticipation. Rabbits, by contrast exhibit the opportunistic propensities of a stalker 
who surveys the field and when food is observed rushes quickly to gather or capture it. 
The trapper initiates the contracts by making the offers (setting the traps) and the stalker 
terminates the contracts by accepting the offers (rushing to take advantage of offers that 
have been made). 
The analysis will proceed with an attempt to find support for statements that describe a 
statistical relationship between a subject's behavior and the subject's relative success. The 
general conjecture advanced in this section is that the existence of these two types of 
agents in the markets, rabbits and wolves, effects the market dynamics in such a way that 
some of the conventional properties of markets do not hold (as shown in the previous 
section). Of course, these ideas are not sufficiently formal to rigorously test and the 
experiments were not designed to test for such phenomena anyway. Thus, this section 
develops conjectures and organizes such support that exists. 
The first conjecture relates the intuitive concepts of rabbits and wolves to particular 
properties of the experimental markets. These properties are thus used to identify wolves 
and rabbits as properties of individual subjects. 
CONJECTURE 1. The presence ofthe two different types of agents (wolves and rabbits) 
in the markets resulted in the following properties of the data. 
(i). The more "active subjects" in terms of making bids or asks, tend to extract more 
profits. Subjects with a tendency to be trappers are more profitable. 
(ii). Subjects specialize as trappers or stalkers. They tend to either always initiate the 
transaction by tendering bids or asks (trapping) or always terminate the transaction by 
accepting bids or accepting asks (stalking). 
(iii). Most of the transactions are made early in a period (usually the first minute). 
(iv). Subjects who terminate many transactions during the first minute of a period (the 
quick stalkers), tend to have lower profit than those who tend to initiate transactions 
during the same time interval (the quick trappers). This phenomena does not hold for the 
other time intervals and is thus unrelated to the fact that asks taken tend to be at prices 
higher than bids taken. 
SUPPORT. There are four parts of the conjecture that need support. Part (i) is supported 
by an OLS estimate of the following equation: 
where: 
Yij - is the average relative profit of subject i in experiment j. 
Formally Yij=[ProfiV(LkeiProfitkj)]500, where I is a set of all5 buyers (0, 1, 2 
3, 4) if subject i is a buyer or I is the set ofall5 sellers (5,6,7,8,9) if subject 
i is a seller. Profitij is the profit of subject i in experiment j. 
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Xij- is the average relative percentage ofBids/Asks of subject i in experimentj. 
Formally Xij=[BA#i/(LkEIBA# kj)]500, where I is a set of all 5 buyers (0, 1, 2 
3, 4) if subject i is a buyer or I is the set of all 5 sellers (5,6,7,8,9) if subject 
i is a seller. BA#ij is the number of Bids/Asks that subject i made in 
experiment j. 
OLS estimates of the above equation are in Table 10. Notice that the estimate ofb (.0562) 
is positive and significantly different from zero (t-statistic is 4.5). This suggests that those 
subjects who make more bids/asks (act more actively) than other members of their 
trading group (buyers for a buyer and sellers for a seller) tend to have higher profit 
relatively to the other members of their trading group while less active trader tend to have 
lesser relative profit. 
Part (ii) holds that subjects specialize. In the limit this means that if a subject made N 
transactions during a period then he either terminated all of them or initiated all of them. 
Table 11 contains the frequencies which show how many different patterns of such 
behavior exist in a particular experiment. Consider experiment 02 in which 10 subjects 
participated for 20 periods, giving a total of200 observations. Now, the upper left 
frequency in Table 11 is 53 which means that in 53 of the 200 observations in experiment 
02, the subject of the observation terminated 0% of his or her transactions in the period. 
This means that in experiment 02 there were 53 occurrences when a subject would initiate 
all of his transactions ( would terminate 0%) in a particular period. The lower left corner 
of Table 11 corresponds to experiment 02's 100% pattern and contains the number 56. 
This means that in that experiment there were 56 occurrences when a subject would 
terminate 1 00% of his transactions in a period. Notice that the numbers in the first and in 
the last row of the Table exceed numbers in the other rows in all cases except one 
(experiment 03). This means that 0% and 100% patterns dominated experiments. Thus, 
subjects specialize. 
Part (iii) captures the impact of early transactions. Table 12 contains the numbers of 
transactions made in the first 30 seconds of a period. For example, there were 93 
transactions made in the first 30 second of experiment 03 and there were 11 transactions 
made in the 30 second interval of211-240. The table demonstrates that the number of 
transactions completed in the first minute (the first two 30-second segments) of a period 
exceed the number of transactions made during any other one minute time interval of that 
period. Exceptions are experiments 05 and 25. Notice that in experiment 25, which 
involved Phys. Tech. subjects, only 1 transaction was made during the first 30 seconds of 
all experiments combined while in two of the four experiments that involved subjects 
from the Russian Open University (14 and 30) about 50% or more of all transactions 
were made during the first minute of a period. 
Part (iv) stands for the fact that those who tend to grab (Hvatat) early in a period usually 
end up with lower profits. This part is supported by an OLS estimate of the following 
equations separately for different time intervals: 
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where: 
K- denotes a particular time interval within a period as follows: K=l -first 30 seconds 
K=2- second thirty seconds, K=3- second minute, K=4- third and fourth minute, 
K =5 - last minute. 
Yii - is the average relative profit of subject i in experiment j. 
Formally Yii=[Profiti(L:kErProfitk)]500, where I is a set of all 5 buyers (0, 1, 2 
3, 4) if subject i is a buyer or I is the set of all 5 sellers (5,6,7,8,9) if subject 
i is a seller. Profitii is the profit of subject i in experiment j. 
ZiiK_ is the average relative percentage of transactions terminated by subject i in 
experiment j during time interval K. 
Formally Zii=[T#ii/(IkE1T#k)]500, where I is a set of all 5 buyers (0, 1, 2 
3, 4) if subject i is a buyer or I is the set of all 5 sellers (5,6,7,8,9) if subject 
i is a seller. T#ii is the number of transaction that subject i terminated in 
experiment j. 
OLS estimates of the above equation for five different time intervals are in Table 13 
which presents results of five regressions. Notice that the estimate ofb is negative and 
significantly different from zero in the first two regressions which cover the first 60 
seconds of a period. This can be seen from the first two regressions in the table: 
coefficients bare -.24 and -.27, t-statistics are -4.43 and -2.28. None of the other three 
regressions (the last three regressions in the table) which deal with the other four minutes 
of a period produce estimates ofb significantly different from zero; t-statistics forb are 
1.67, -.30 and .78. Thus it is concluded that early" stalker's" activity leads to relatively 
lower profits and thus points in the direction of a possible rabbit, while this phenomena 
does not hold for later" stalker's" activity. 
The above conjectures establish statistical properties of the data. Whether or not the 
property of Hvatat can be associated with particular individuals is a different story. The 
next conjecture is that wolves and rabbits can be associated with the behaviors of 
particular individuals in experiments. It is not just a statistical property of the population. 
At this time there is no foundation for a conjecture that all individuals can be fit into one 
of these classes but there is evidence to support the conjecture of the presence of the 
types. 
CONJECTURE 2: Rabbits and wolves can be identified. At least one rabbit and one 
wolf can be identified in 11 of the 13 experiments (The exceptions are experiments 02 
and 25). 
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SUPPORT. First the presence of rabbits will be demonstrated. As established above, a 
good indicator of a rabbit is an early "stalker" who tends to have lower than average net 
profit. Therefore, in search for rabbits we shall compare two sets of data: average relative 
profits (as defined in the support of Conjecture 1) per subject, per experiment and 
numbers of early transactions terminated by a subject in an experiment. The former is in 
the upper part of Table 14, and the latter is in the lower part of Table 14. As an example 
of how to read the table consider experiment 02 in which subject 0 had profit equal to 
99% (upper left comer of the upper part of Table) of the average profit among his fellow 
buyers (subjects 0,1,2,3 and 4) in that experiment. The upper left comer ofthe bottom 
part of the Table shows that this person terminated a total of 15 transactions within the 
first minute of periods in that experiment. 
In all but three experiments subjects who had highest (among participants of the same 
experiment) numbers oftransactions terminated in the first minute have lowest (or among 
lowest) relative profits. These suspected rabbits are shadowed in the Table. For example, 
in experiment 30 subject 2, a buyer, terminated 58 transactions early and his relative 
profit was 87% of average among buyers in that experiment. According to the "model" 
this type of behavior can be attributed to rabbits. Notice that for each experiment only one 
or two such suspects are identified. If in addition to the outliners (shadowed), subjects 
who simply terminated a lot of transactions early are also taken into account, then there is 
no consistency between these numbers and profits. For example, subjects 0 and 1 in 
experiment 6 terminated 25 and 27 early transactions respectively. These are rather high 
numbers since 5 of 1 0 of participants of that experiments terminated less than 1 0 such 
transactions. On the other hand these two subjects' profits are both 101% of the average. 
Therefore, as a group they do not fit the profile of rabbits as they are being characterized 
here. The measure of rabbits is crude and in order to identify rabbits beyond those that 
exist in the extremes, a more refined measure will be needed. Thus, although there is a 
possibility that there were more rabbits than we identified in each experiment, they 
cannot be identified with this particular criteria of individual behavior. 
As a second step in the support of the conjecture, the existence of wolves must be 
established. Wolves can primarily be identified by their relationship with rabbits. If 
there were no rabbits, then wolves may be hard to spot. On the other hand, if rabbits exist 
among the buyers then one must study to determine if a wolf might have become 
distinguished from among the sellers. If rabbits are on both sides of the market then it 
might be possible to identify wolves on both sides of the market as well. The concept of 
"wolf' is symmetric with the concept of" rabbit" . Therefore we should look for early 
successful trappers. Refer again to Table 14. In experiment 03 (the second column) a 
suspected rabbit is subject 0 (a buyer). Therefore we look for wolves among the sellers. 
Subject 9 (a seller) has the lowest early termination rate among the sellers. He terminated 
just one early transaction during the experiment (bottom part of the table). Consistently 
with the concept of wolf he is one of the most successful subjects among the sellers; his 
average relative profit is 108% (upper part of the table). Repeating this procedure for the 
other experiments (respectively, experiments 05, 06, 10, 11, 13, 14, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30) 
subjects 3, 3, 8, 2, 3, 5, 6, 5, 1, 6 and 6 can respectively be identified as wolves. Notice 
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that in 8 of the 10 cases the identified wolves are the most successful ones and have the 
lowest termination rate of early transactions within their group of buyers or sellers. The 
two exceptions are experiments 13 and 14. 
If individuals can be successfully classified as rabbits then one immediately asks about 
whether the property is temporary or seems to remain under a variety of conditions. If 
the property is only temporary then one might question the value of the classification. 
The next conjecture characterizes what appears to be in the data. 
CONJECTURE 3 (stability) . The classification of individuals remains the same when 
estimated from the data set before shift and the data set after shift or in the pooled data 
set. 
SUPPORT. Recall that all experiments involved two different sets of parameters. 
Subjects who are classified as extreme rabbits or wolves hold the same tags if the data are 
separated into two sets- before the parameter shift and after the parameter shift. The 
columns in Table 15 are the time series of numbers of early transactions that were 
terminated by (classified) rabbits. It shows that there are no tendencies for these numbers 
to decrease by the end of an experiment. For example subject 6 in experiment 5 (second 
column ofthe table) terminated 14 early transactions before the shift occurs (first ten 
rows of the table) and 17 early transactions after the shift (last nine rows of the table). 
This pattern holds for other subjects as well, with the exception of subject 5 in 
experiment 13 (seventh column of the table), who terminated 18 early transactions before 
the shift and terminated only 1 0 early transactions after the shift. 
The numbers in the table are closely related to the profitability of a subject in an 
experiment. Therefore, if the numbers do not decrease with time, the rabbit classification 
remains robust against data separations. Subjects who are classified as wolves terminated 
the least numbers of early transactions in the whole experiment (usually no more than 5). 
Therefore, if periods before and after the shift are considered separately, then the 
classification remains the same because the numbers can only decrease from being 
already low. 
The next conjecture attempts to associate the Hvatat property and associated rabbits and 
wolves, with the overall market behavior. 
CONJECTURE 4. The presence of wolves and rabbits in the experiments caused the 
absence of the conventional features of the markets. In particular the existence of rabbits 
and wolves cause (i) high price variance, (ii) the absence of a strong rent asymmetry 
effect and (iii) the absence ofthe pushing property of price ceilings. 
SUPPORT. This conjecture is based on an idea about the mechanism through which the 
presence of rabbits and wolves could operate. The idea is that the existence of rabbits 
affects the variance of prices which in turn has an impact on the direction of convergence 
and accounts for the lack of a strong rent asymmetry effect and the lack of a strong price 
16 
control effect. The idea in support of part (i) starts with the presumption that there are 
rabbits and wolves on both sides of the market. The wolf buyers will tender low bids that 
are immediately accepted by rabbit sellers and the wolf sellers will tender high asks that 
are immediately accepted by rabbit buyers. The result is a high price variance that 
continues until the trading capacity of rabbits is exhausted. This high variance leads to 
little period to period adjustment. Part (ii) rests on the observation that the lack of period 
to period adjustment is a different dynamic than typically exists. Ordinarily prices adjust 
from one side or the other. If prices start high the dynamic is to approach from above and 
if they start low the dynamic is to come in from below. However, in the presence of 
rabbits and wolves high prices may not be followed by high prices as the wolves on the 
other side of the market set their traps. Thus, if prices start high they are not followed by 
high prices and thus there is no consistent convergence from above. Thus, to understand 
part (iii), if there is no coordination of strategies in general in the sense of a convergence 
process, there cannot be a coordination of strategies caused by the price ceiling. Thus the 
price ceiling did not have the dynamic effect that has been previously observed. 
Data that demonstrate the possible impact of extreme rabbits on the dynamics of the price 
adjustment process help with a possible characterization of part (iii) of the conjecture. 
Given the crude tools only extreme behaviors are identified but in 11 of the thirteen 
experiments (all but experiments 02 and 25) rabbits could be identified. Rabbit buyers 
were identified in experiments 03,06,10,13,14,26,27 and 30. Rabbit sellers were 
identified in experiments 05,11,13 and 28. Notice that in ten experiments (all but one, 
experiment 13) the identified rabbits were only on one side of the market. If extreme 
rabbits have an influence on price the one would expect the former experiments (with 
extreme rabbit buyers) to converge from above and the latter (with extreme rabbit sellers) 
to converge from below. The estimated origin B;i in Table 3 indicates the direction of 
convergence (by comparison with the asymptote). Of the ten experiments considered, 
five converged from above (experiments 10,14,26,27 and 30) and five converged from 
below (experiments 03, 05, 06,11 and 28). Thus in 8 of the 10 experiments under 
consideration, the direction of price convergence was from the side of the identified 
extreme rabbit. 
The thesis above is that the Hvatat phenomena is responsible for the special market 
behaviors that are observed. That thesis naturally suggests additional questions about 
why the phenomena exists. Were the Russian subjects exhibiting learned behavior or is 
the Hvatat property a more general feature of behavior when people have a degree of 
confusion or lack of understanding? The question that follows is stated in a manner to 
focus on the issue. 
THE QUESTION: PREDISPOSITION or CONFUSION? 
(i) THE PREDISPOSITION HYPOTHESIS: The Hvatat property reflects a 
predisposition to the use of certain types of strategies and also a predisposition to be 
insensitive to information that would cause a change in those strategies. 
(ii) THE CONFUSION HYPOTHESIS: The Hvatat property reflects confusion on the 
part of some people. When they are confused they act with a certain myopia that leads to 
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quick actions when any profits are seen and a myopia that prevents the use of other 
strategies. 
On one hand, the Russian subjects might simply be using strategies that they have used in 
the economy with which they have experience. A strategy of quick "grabbing" is useful 
in their daily lives. Clearly such a suspicion lead us to investigate the possibility of a 
Hvatat property as part of subject behavior in the first place. The idea that shortages 
would give people training in that mode of behavior is very consistent with experimental 
evidence. For example, experiments with artificial limitations on market volume exhibit a 
tendency for subjects to grab whatever exists (Plott, 1983)8. That is, when the equilibrium 
volume is x but market activity is limited to x-y<x individuals clamor to be among the 
first x-y traders. Price variance is high and there is no real evidence of convergence to 
the unconstrained equilibrium price . The most profitable individuals are those that are 
quickest to grab whatever might exist in the market. There is no negotiation since the 
shortage gives each trader a "take it or leave it" choice. Ifthe offer is not taken 
immediately when it presents itself then it is lost completely. Experience with shortages 
could certainly teach people to "grab" . 
On the other hand the Hvatat phenomena cannot be observed in all experiments. The 
phenomena is" spotty" in the sense that it is simply not observed in the Phys. Tech. 
experiments, such as experiment 25. No subject is quick to grab whatever profitable deals 
might exist in the market and the price variance is very small. Therefore it is impossible 
to claim there will be rabbits in any Russian subject pool just because it is a Russian 
subject pool. For a number of reasons Phys. Tech. subjects are assumed to be the 
quickest to understand the instructions and how to participate in the markets. This lends 
support to the idea that some of the subjects in the non Phys. Tech. subjects were simply 
confused by a new type of activity and were slow to catch on. Thus, confusion could be 
responsible for the existence of the phenomena. 
However, the phenomena has a degree of persistence as was shown in Conjecture 3. If it 
is confusion then one would expect it to go away with experience. It is with this 
argument that one can see the two hypotheses joined to produce an unusual type of 
Hvatat equilibrium. While there is a reduction of variance and convergence over time, it 
was slow. The high variance made any tendency for convergence hard to detect and 
many Russians were not predisposed to look for or expect any type of equilibration. 
Those with the greater confusion were less likely to absorb the equilibration tendencies 
that existed. Thus, those with tendencies to be rabbits retained that proclivity and did not 
learn from the signals that existed in the market. Of course their presence in the market 
provided the self fulfilling expectations by maintaining high variance in the markets. 
Thus, both ideas can find support in the sense that a predisposition existed to grab that 
was exacerbated by confusion in the groups that had less learning capacity. The subjects 
sc. R. Plott, "Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal 93 (March 
1983):106-127. 
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did not expect to see equilibration and thus very little learning was reflected in their 
behavior. On the other hand the subjects from Phys. Tech. captured the logic of the 
situation and behaved in a very "western" manner. The Phys. Tech. subjects detected the 
equilibration and their awareness reinforced the tendency whereas subjects from other 
subject pools did not detect the signals that existed and thus did not alter their behavior 
accordingly. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The law of supply and demand works well in Moscow. A degree of anxiousness seems to 
exist in some subjects in the sense that they are too quick to act at first. It is as though 
they are impulsive or follow a rule of thumb that tells them to accept anything that is to 
their benefit without waiting and studying the market conditions. Nevertheless, the 
tendency is not so pronounced that it prevents the operation of the pervasive market 
forces of convergence. 
Phenomena that have been observed but not explained in experiments in the west are not 
observed in these Russian experiments. In that sense the data reported here are very 
different. Prices do not converge from the direction of rent asymmetry. Non binding 
price controls do not have the effect that has been observed in the west. The bid/ask 
equation that captures price movements so well in the west does not work in these data. 
The experiments produced two results that have only recently been reported in the 
literature. First, the existence of a transactions cost (that does not alter the gains from 
marginal trades) does not alter the equilibrating tendency to the competitive equilibrium. 
This is a particularly interesting finding that forms a beginning for investigations of 
transactions costs that are independent from the notions of information and search. 
Secondly the prices of asks that are taken tend to be above the prices of bids that are 
taken. Hopefully this property will be investigated in the data that exists for experiments 
that have been conducted in the west. It may provide another tool for the analysis of the 
dynamics of the price discovery process 
We seem to have discovered an interesting property of human behavior. The concept of 
Hvatat led us to look carefully at the subjects. Our predisposition was to think that social 
background was responsible for creating a subject pool willing to myopically grab 
anything in a market that they felt was advantageous and to do so without search or 
"negotiation." We characterized such impulsive behavior as "rabbit-like" and 
proceeded to look closely for rabbits. We reasoned that the social influences and 
resulting rabbits would account for the differences in market behavior in the east as 
compared to the west. Interestingly enough, close examination revealed that there does 
not seem to have been many rabbits. In addition, wolves, which were a different type of 
subject, emerged from the subject pool in response to the rabbits that did exist. This fact, 
and the fact that we saw dramatic differences among Russian subject pools, led us to 
suspect that the rabbit and wolf behaviors are typical of people in general. Our conjecture 
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is Hvatat, the rabbit behavior, is characteristic of confusion, conservatism that reflects 
confusion, or differential learning as opposed to some sort of social preconditioning. Our 
observations are such that we wonder if this type of behavior might be observed in the 
west as well as in Russia. It might have been more pronounced in Russia because the 
abstract setting of the experiment was less familiar. Thus, perhaps confusion and the 
behavior it produces was more pronounced in Russia; and it was possibly only our 
mistaken belief about the impact of the culture that led us to look. 
20 
Table 1: Experimental Conditions 
Experiment Location Price Ceil. Bid/Ask Param. change 
Number Subjects Exits tax (period) 
(period) (period) 
921102; Moscow none none (0-10) 
No.02 University (11-end) 
year 4-5 sys.bk. (15) 
921103; Moscow Univ. none none (0-10) 
No.03 year 3 (11-end) 
921105; Moscow Univ. none none (0-10) 
No.05 year 1 (11-end) 
921106; Moscow 380 (0-8) none (0-10) 
No.06 University 420 (9-end) (11-end) 
year 4-5 
921110; Moscw.Phys. 380 (0-8) none (0-10) 
No.10 Tech.Instit.& 420 (9-end) (11-end) 
M.S.U.mixed sys.bk. (U) 
921111; Mixed 390 (0-8) none (0-10) 
No.11 420 (9-end) (11-end) 
921113; Moscow.Univ. none 3 (0-10) 
No.13 year 4-5 all periods (11-end) 
921114; Russian none 3 (0-10} 
No.14 Open Univ. all periods (11-end) 
921125; Moscow none 4 (0-10) 
No.25 Phys.Tech. all periods (11-end) 
Inst. 
921126 i Russian none none (0-10) 
No.26 Open Univ. (11-end) 
921127 i Russian 390 (0-8) none (0-10) 
No.27 Open Univ. 420 (9-end) (11-end) 
Businessmen sys . bk . ( 1 0) 
921128; Teenagers none 2 (0-10) 
No.28 all periods (11-end) 
sys.bk. (1) 
921130; Russian none 4 (0-10) 
No.29 Open Univ. all periods (11-end) 
Businessmen 
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Table 2. Induced Values and Costs. 
PERIODS 0-10 PERIODS 11-END 
Redemption Buyer Unit Cost Seller Redemption Buyer Unit Cost Seller 
Value I .D. I.D. Value I.D. I. D. 
510 0 275 5 550 4 315 9 
510 1 275 6 550 0 315 5 
510 2 275 7 550 1 315 6 
500 3 280 8 540 2 320 7 
490 4 285 9 530 3 325 8 
480 4 290 9 520 3 330 8 
470 3 295 8 510 2 335 7 
460 2 300 7 500 1 340 6 
450 1 305 6 490 0 345 5 
440 0 310 5 480 4 350 9 
430 0 315 5 470 4 355 9 
420 1 320 6 460 0 360 5 
410 2 325 7 450 1 365 6 
400 3 330 8 440 2 370 7 
390 4 335 9 430 3 375 8 
380 4 340 9 420 3 380 8 
370 3 345 8 410 2 385 7 
360 2 350 7 400 1 390 6 
360 1 350 6 400 0 390 5 
360 0 350 5 400 4 390 9 
350 0 360 5 390 4 400 9 
340 1 370 6 380 0 410 5 
330 2 380 7 370 1 420 6 
320 3 390 8 360 2 430 7 
310 4 400 9 350 3 440 8 
300 4 410 9 340 3 450 8 
290 3 420 8 330 2 460 7 
280 2 430 7 320 1 470 6 
270 1 440 6 310 0 480 5 
260 0 450 5 300 4 490 9 
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Table 3. 
Ordinary least square estimation of the convergence process before the shift in parameters 
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Table 4. 
Ordinary least square estimation of the convergence process after the shift in parameters 
(periods 11-19). 
















Corrected R -squared 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Standard Error of the Regression 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 







































Standard Deviations of Transaction Prices 
Experiment Standard Deviations of Transaction Prices 
Number Subject Type Periods 1...10 Periods 11 ... 19 
02 MSU 14.452 6.587 
03 MSU 15.294 14.530 
05 MSU 12.159 12.508 
06 MSU 14.741 8.456 
10 PhysTech 4.894 9.053 
11 Mixed 12.165 9.583 
13 MSU 17.557 11.646 
14 ROU 23.247 10.817 
25 PhysTech 7.415 11.491 
26 ROU 25.256 12.494 
27 ROU 17.616 17.305 
28 Teenagers 18.985 13.402 
30 ROU 24.771 13.372 
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Table 6. 
Average Transaction Prices (per period, per experiment). 
Experiment # 
02 03 05 06 10 11 13 14 25 26 27 28 30 
Period Average Transaction Prices (per period, per experiment) 
1 340 351 364 331 357 341 344 360 350 370 354 352 364 
2 341 355 364 338 365 348 335 392 364 350 361 358 354 
3 346 352 356 343 365 353 354 388 363 363 369 356 360 
4 346 362 357 342 363 359 344 376 365 377 363 353 359 
5 357 365 344 345 362 358 349 371 362 361 364 352 356 
6 356 362 346 350 361 358 349 375 359 346 369 348 365 
7 360 359 354 352 360 358 348 372 358 365 367 344 364 
8 363 354 354 352 359 356 354 372 359 366 367 346 363 
9 364 358 355 361 360 357 354 368 356 361 385 353 370 
10 365 357 353 365 359 361 358 365 356 365 382 354 358 
Shift in Parameters Occurs 
11 385 372 370 380 379 374 379 388 370 386 396 375 384 
12 387 386 379 391 391 383 386 399 376 399 392 382 385 
13 389 388 387 397 399 387 393 394 385 418 402 383 393 
14 392 393 391 402 403 393 405 398 393 416 402 396 395 
15 395 400 397 403 403 394 408 400 395 412 401 399 398 
16 394 402 399 399 401 395 408 401 397 412 400 398 400 
17 395 404 392 397 401 395 401 401 400 409 401 400 398 
18 394 404 393 396 396 395 399 398 407 402 401 403 





Experiment Average Numbers of Total Numbers of Total Numbers of 
# BIDS/ ASKS Made by an BIDS/ ASKS Made Multiple Unit 
Individual in a Period in the Experiment BIDS/ ASKS Made 
in the 
18.0 1760 
3 18.1 1 166 
5 18.8 1875 11 
6 16.5 1631 33 
0 10.2 991 332 
Experiments with Price Ceiling Imposed. 
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Table 8. 
OLS Estimates of the Bid/ Ask Adjustment Equation 
P1-P1_1=a+b[(#bids in t-1)-(#asks in t-1)] 
Experiment Independent Estimated Standard t-
Variable Coefficient Error Statistic 
02 a 4.69 1.492 3.145 
b 0.20 0.120 1.671 
03 a 4.48 3.010 11.489 
b 0.14 0.160 0.905 
05 a -19.02 10.093 -1.884 
b 0.56 0.275 2.039 
06 a 2.99 1.487 2.009 
b 0.086 0.179 0.482 
10 a 2.97 1.847 1.609 
b 0.15 0.126 1.220 
11 a 6.81 2.022 3.370 
b 0.24 0.103 2.340 
13 a 1.33 2.759 0.482 
b 0.22 0.195 1.119 
14 a 6.03 5.077 1.187 
b 0.32 0.238 1.324 
25 a 3.00 1.538 1.950 
b 0.31 0.243 1.262 
26 a 5.30 4.102 1.291 
b 0.24 0.262 0.930 
27 a 0.08 4.055 0.019 
b -0.13 0.178 -0.714 
28 a -2.70 5.012 -0.538 
b 0.27 0.251 1.091 
30 a 1.98 4.503 0.439 
b -0.078 0.259 -0.295 
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Table 9. 
Differences between the average price of a contract in which an ask was taken by a buyer 
and the average price of a contract in which a bid was accepted by a seller (per period, per 
experiment). 
Experiment # 
02 03 05 06 10 11 13 14 25 26 27 28 30 
Period# Differences Between the Average Price of an Ask Taken and the Average Price 
of a Bid Taken, per period, per experiment 
1 7 52 15 0 11 30 10 11 34 -8 
2 16 35 16 12 8 18 25 7 34 40 38 50 
3 15 26 21 20 5 18 33 48 9 66 27 42 
4 11 18 31 6 4 6 30 43 9 35 54 23 39 
5 13 24 13 5 16 28 40 7 32 38 27 40 
6 9 8 8 3 15 19 25 1 1 15 39 
7 11 13 14 16 2 10 6 17 1 20 28 38 
8 8 13 11 5 1 6 11 23 1 13 0 38 
9 12 6 3 9 1 13 4 16 4 7 22 10 
10 10 8 11 1 4 7 16 1 12 23 11 9 
11 16 26 12 -4 16 12 15 9 21 28 
12 13 14 17 0 -3 9 9 10 6 0 18 12 
13 7 14 -1 0 6 7 6 2 17 11 36 
14 8 11 6 4 0 7 -1 2 8 8 6 
15 4 11 2 3 2 5 3 2 1 1 
16 2 4 0 6 2 6 5 1 0 5 10 2 11 
17 0 9 4 0 2 2 5 0 10 2 6 
18 3 8 2 4 6 3 1 6 12 0 24 
19 2 4 3 4 1 8 1 5 10 0 
20 1 0 0 0 
Data are rounded to the nearest integer. 
If a cell is empty then transactions of only one type (Bid Taken or Ask Taken) occurred 
during that period. 
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Table 10. 
OLS Estimates of the Average Relative Profit as a Function of the Number of Bids/Asks 
made by an Individual 
Yij - is the average relative profit of subject i in experiment j. 
Formally Yij=Profiti(LkeiProfitkj), where I is a set of all 5 buyers (0,1 ,2 
3, 4) if subject i is a buyer or I is the set of all 5 sellers if subject 
i is a seller. Profitij is the profit of subject i in experiment j. 
Xij - is the average relative number of Bids/ Asks of subejct i in experiment j. 
Formally Xij=BA#/(Lke1BA#k), where I is a set of all5 buyers (0, 1, 2 
3, 4) if subject i is a buyer or I is the set of all 5 sellers if subject 
i is a seller. BA#ij is the number of Bids/ Asks that subject i made in 
experiment j. 
Coefficient OLS Standard Error t-Statistic 
Estimate 
a 94.37 1.380 68.382 
b 5.62e-002 1.25le-002 4.496 
Number of 130 
Observations 
R-squared 0.136 
Corrected R-squared 0.129 
Sum of Squared 5634.2 
Residuals 








Frequencies of Different Patterns of Behavior. 
Event X%: X=T/(I+T)*lOO 
where: T- number of transactions that a subject terminated in a period 
I- number of transactions that a subject initiated in a period 
Experiment # 
02 03 05 06 10 11 13 14 25 26 
Event Frequencies of Events in Experiments 
0% 53 35 80 45 43 44 40 63 51 46 
16.6% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
20% 2 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 
25% 28 23 6 21 25 24 17 13 16 13 
33.3% 3 10 2 10 7 10 22 9 14 13 
40% 2 4 0 4 1 5 0 0 0 0 
50% 24 30 7 29 17 25 31 8 27 34 
60% 1 2 0 3 2 3 2 1 1 3 
66.6% 4 1"1 r "" 6 ,..., 1 " 11"\ 1 1 ,,.... l.J .J .J I i.J lV 11 lL 
75% 24 37 10 25 16 30 30 23 16 19 
80% 3 3 3 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 
100% 56 29 77 46 51 41 35 59 52 45 
31 
27 28 30 
83 60 66 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
6 13 13 
1 8 12 
0 0 0 
5 19 7 
1 0 1 
1 12 9 
9 23 10 
1 1 0 
82 54 71 
Table 12. 
Numbers of Transactions (Trade Volume) made during different time intervals. 
Experiment # 
02 03 05 06 10 11 13 14 25 26 27 28 30 
Time interval Numbers of Transactions 
0-30 sec. 102 93 26 72 88 67 64 145 1 71 91 70 111 
31-60 sec. 80 73 36 87 39 61 67 67 18 67 71 63 66 
61-90 sec. 64 44 46 50 46 56 57 34 28 44 62 60 49 
91-120 sec. 45 35 34 46 27 39 41 29 33 41 40 37 29 
121-150 sec. 28 28 35 36 26 40 38 22 39 31 25 34 23 
151-180 sec. 23 24 26 24 12 20 17 12 34 23 23 26 20 
181-210 sec. 14 18 28 14 14 19 18 12 37 15 15 15 12 
211-240 sec. 10 11 28 7 15 23 17 9 32 19 14 12 13 
241-270 sec. 17 19 35 13 20 18 16 12 41 16 11 15 17 
271-300 sec. 11 19 49 18 29 23 15 9 35 20 16 20 11 
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Table 13. 
OLS Estimates of Average Relative Profits as a Function of the Number of Transactions 
Terminated by an Individual During Different Time Intervals. 
Coefficient OLS Standard t- R2 
Estimate Error Statistic 
Regression # 1 : First 30 Seconds of a Period 
a 102.8 .699 146.6 .12 
b -.24 .055 -4.433 
Regression #2: Second 30 Seconds of a Period 
a 101.6 .823 123.5 .07 
b -.27 .096 -2.889 
Regression #3: Second Minute of a Period 
a 98.7 .96 102.4 .02 
b .15 .089 1.67 
Regression #4 Third and Fourth minutes of a Period 
a 100.2 1.01 99.45 .0007 
b -.02 .09 -.30 
Regression #5 Last minute of a Period 
a 99.5 0.80 123.8 .004 
b 0.11 0.13 0.78 
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Table 14 
Average Relative Profits (as defined in Conjecture 1) and Numbers of Transactions 















Average Relative Profit Over All Periods2 
101 106 101 99 108 101 
103 134 
76 101 88 
107 94 90 
105 102 94 99 101 86 
Total (All Periods) Numbers of Transactions By the Subject Terminated in the First 
Minute 
0 15 25 21 19 4 





6 1 6 0 
7 13 3 8 5 28 
8 2 15 0 3 17 1 2 13 0 10 
9 5 1 2 9 3 3 13 0 2 12 0 28 
Note: A subject numbered i in experiment j had exactly the same parameters as the (different) subject 
numbered in experiment k. 
25 
0 
Note: The shaded cells in the lower panel represent the "most active" subjects in the experiment. Shaded 
cells in the upper panel correspond to the shaded cells in the lower panel. Thus the table facilitates a 
comparison of relative activity data and relative profits data. 
1 A subject numbered i in experimentj had exactly the same parameters as did the (different) subject i in 
experiment j' . 
2 Shaded cells in the lower panel represent the "most active" subjects in the experiment (The largest 
number in the column.). Shaded cells in the top panel correspond to the shaded cells in the lower panel. 
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Table 15. 
Numbers of Transactions Terminated by Suspected Rabbits During the First Minute of 
Each Period. 
Experiment# 03 05 06 10 11 13 13 14 26 26 27 28 30 
Subject# 00 06 04 03 06 04 05 01 00 04 00 05 02 
Period# Numbers of Transactions Terminated During the First Minute 
1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
2 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 
3 3 1 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 
4 3 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 
5 3 1 4 4 3 2 2 3 1 1 4 3 2 
6 3 1 4 4 3 2 2 3 1 2 4 4 2 
7 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 3 3 3 2 
8 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 
9 2 2 4 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 
10 1 2 3 2 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 
11 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 4 4 3 2 4 
12 1 1 3 3 2 2 4 1 3 3 2 4 
13 0 1 3 3 2 1 1 5 2 4 2 4 
14 3 2 2 3 2 2 4 1 2 4 1 4 
15 1 3 3 3 1 1 4 2 1 4 5 
16 1 2 3 4 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 4 
17 1 3 2 4 3 3 2 1 3 1 4 
18 3 1 3 2 3 4 4 2 5 2 4 












Figure 1: Parameters as Market Demand and 
Supply 
Market demand 
























FIGURE 2. EXPERIMENT 02. 


































FIGURE 3. EXPERIMENT 03. 





























FIGURE 4. EXPERIMENT 05. 
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FIGURE 5. EXPERIMENT 06. 

































FIGURE 6. EXPERIMENT 10. 






































































































FIGURE 9. EXPERIMENT 14. 

































FIGURE 10. EXPERIMENT 25. 
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FIGURE 14. !EXPERIMENT 30. 
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